【明報文章】The West has charged that Iran sent ballistic missiles to Russia marking a qualitatively different level of cooperation between the two countries.

On September 30, Russia's PM, Mikhail Mishustin arrived in Tehran to discuss intergovernmental affairs. The trip comes before the BRICS+ summit which will be held in Russia's city of Kazan in late October and amid ongoing talks between Moscow and Tehran on signing a major intergovernmental agreement.

The two countries have advanced their cooperation following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Political as well as military ties reached unprecedented levels with most recent reports released by Western media outlets about the Islamic Republic having allegedly sent short-range ballistic missiles (Fath-360 model) to Russia. As a result, the US and some European countries imposed additional sanctions on Iran. The weaponry is not seen as a means capable of shifting the balance of power on the ground in Ukraine, but with the range of some 120 km the missiles nevertheless could, as Western officials believe, serve well Russia's war effort.

Tehran denied the news, Moscow remained mute, but the recurrence of similar reports from late 2023 highlights the intensity of cooperation. It is clear that Russia weaponizes its expanding ties with Iran to pressure the West. The calculus is pretty straightforward. Ukraine remains a central area where Russia attempts to prevail over the West. Iran is deemed by Moscow as one of the tools to achieve this goal. It is for this purpose that Russia threatens the West with oblique position regarding Iran's nuclear issue. Long-considered as a team player opposing Tehran's program, Ukraine changed Moscow's calculus. No criticism of Iran or open opposition on its nuclear ambitions are now a blueprint of Russia's approach.

Weaponization is also evidenced by the reports of Russia's increasingly active ties with the Houthis, a Yemeni Shia military organization, which has turned into a powerful player within Iran's Axis of Resistance and threatened global shipping in the Red Sea. By sending advanced missiles to the peninsula Moscow now risks angering Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two Arab countries which engaged militarily to defeat the Houthis and see the latter as an outpost of Iranian influence.

Yet not all is benign in Russo-Iranian relations. The new Iranian president and his associates intend to usher in a new era in the country's foreign policy, which up until now has been characterized by a heavy focus on closer ties with China and Russia. Now, however, engagement with the West re-emerges on the agenda in Tehran. The new team pushes (at least rhetorically) for reaching an understanding with the US over the nuclear agreement which would allow lifting heavy sanctions off Iranian economy.

This obviously concerns Russia too given the expanding partnership with Moscow and the latter's own deteriorating ties with the West. Kremlin is worried that Iran's foreign policy might experience if not dramatic then certainly nuanced shifts where normalization with the US would come in exchange for Tehran's closer ties with Moscow. Iran's foreign affairs minister, Abbas Araghchi, in one of the interviews argued: “We approach relations with Europe from a new angle and a new perspective…”

Iran understands well that Russia needs the Islamic Republic. But it also sees that Moscow's willingness to expand ties is largely motivated by pressuring the West. Often Moscow sides with Iran's competitors as it happened with the joint declaration with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries where the issue of the three islands in the Persian Gulf held by Iran was raised. The Russian side openly opted for the UAE's position.

Even in the military realm not all goes well. Iran still has not gotten Su-35s. Tehran also eyes other Russia technologies, but the Russian side seems to be cautious perhaps because of its own close ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The latter two have normalized ties with Iran but the geopolitical competition has not gone anywhere. Russia might also be willing to avoid complete breakdown of already tense ties with Israel.

Russia's stance in the South Caucasus, where Azerbaijan seeks to advance a corridor via the southernmost region of Syunik in Armenia, has also caused anxiety in Tehran. Iran is concerned that a corridor, which would connect Turkey to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, would shift the balance of power and deprive the country of its physical connection to Armenia and Georgia's Black Sea ports.

Distrust have now reached new heights as each understands that the other is used as a tool to extract concessions from the West. It is unlikely however that relations between Russia and Iran will deteriorate to the point that where their cooperation is fragmented. Indeed, the Iranian president confirmed he will attend the BRICS+ summit and the two sides will sign a major agreement. The two will also remain animated by the opposition to the West. Yet, their ties have also grown exclusively transactional leaving little room for an official alliance.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

[Emil Avdaliani]