【明報文章】Turkey and Iran are competitors due to their territorial size, population growth, and historic ambitions to build either Turco- or Irano-centric orders in the Middle East. The two countries look at the present global order through different lens. Iran is highly antagonistic to the West, while Turkey, a member of NATO, seeks maintaining a balance between the East and the West. Yet, both aspouse the idea of a multipolar world order where the West’s power, if not entirely overturned, then should certainly be balanced by other actors. This is well evidenced by Ankara’s and Tehran’s (aspiring) memerbship in SCO and BRICS+, the two entities which are seen as a counterbalance to Western multilateral groupings.

On a more local level, both countries now pursue normalization of ties with neighbors. Both have succeeded in many cases as Ankara’s recent warming of ties with Cairo and Tehran’s with Baku and partially Manama show. This understandably raises a raft of questions on how Iran and Turkey would manage their own bilateral relations especially given the election of Masoud Pezeshkian, in the Islamic Republic and Ankara’s quickly evolving foreign policy posture.

Firstly, the two countries need each other. For instance, one of the key issues which will preoccupy the Iranian leadership in relation to its western neighbor will be Ankara’s continuing presence in northern Syria all along the common border. Ankara wants to push back against Kurdish forces and to achieve this, in many ways, it needs Damascus’ help in that, which is unlikely to materialize given Bashar al-Assad’s animosity towards Turkish military presence on Syrian soil. This is where Turkey needs Iran, which, unlike Russia preoccupied with its war in Ukraine, has actually expanded its influence in Syria. Ankara will therefore be open to cooperation with Iran to gain its support to secure major military moves in northern Syria.

Ankara will also seek Tehran’s cooperation in northern Iraq where Turkey fights the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Moreover, Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi (popular Mobilization Forces), un ambrella of militarized groups, from time to time have likewise threatened Turkish military positions in northern Iraq. This pushes Turkey to maintain close ties with the Islamic Republic which, in Ankara’s view, has often been hesitant to cooperate, but nevertheless holds keys to security in Iraq.

Then come energy ties and here big changes are expected in Turkey’s traditional dependence on Iran. Gas supplies from Iran has been unstable over the past years which further motivated Ankara to work on diversification of gas imports by expanding its dependence on LNG, actively exploring gas fields in the Meditarranean and the Black seas, and constructing infrastructure that would facilitate access to the resources of Iraq and Azerbaijan. These developments will diminish the traditional link with Iran in the coming years. Moreover, diversification will allow Ankara enjoy cheaper gas which means that whatever level of energy cooperation remains with Tehran the latter’s bargaining position could be negatively impacted. Indeed, there are signs that Ankara is already less interested in extending a pipeline deal from Iran which is scheduled to expire in 2026.

Despite this, Tehran and Ankara have expressed interest in stepping up their energy cooperation. A few months after the late Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Ankara in early 2024, which resulted in energy-related business transactions followed by Turkish Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar’s visit to Tehran in April. Trade links are important and has been a renewed promise to expand yearly trade volume to $30 billion from the current $7 billion. The Turkish side also pledged to open an additional border crossing to facilitate bilateral trade. This however will be difficult to achieve given that the bilateral 25-year export contract which ends in 2026 might not be renewed given the US sanctions on Iran. Overall, The Türkiye-Iran High-Level Cooperation Council has been actively working, but still has not produced expected results. A preferential trade agreement is what could provide a major boost though the sanctions imposed on Iran will weigh heavily.

One of the areas of contention between Turkey and Iran will remain Iraq where both has historically pursued greater influence. Before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq Turkey has been an active player through bilateral trade and investments. The post-Saddam period in Iraq, on the other hand, welcomed greater Iranian infleunce in the country well manifested by Pezeshkian’s recent visit to the country and a wide array of Shiite military groups that Tehran supports.

At the same time, Turkey has widened its efforts with Erdogan’s own recent visit to Iraq where massive trade and investments documents were signed and the Development Road project has been advanced. Iran is against the project as it leave out the Islamic Republic, but it also cannot oppose the initiative directly. Perhaps it explains why Pezeshkian was eager to promote Basra-Shalamcheh railway. Basra will be a key city in the Development Road and by linking to this Iraqi hub, Iran hopes to connect to the project.

Another area of contention is in the South Caucasus. For instance, Iran fears that the so-called Zangezur corridor ideally running from Turkey’s east to Azerbaijan proper via Nakhchivan and Armenia’s southernmost province of Syunik would cut the Islamic Republic from the South Caucasus. Judging from the reactions Iranian politicians usually have when the Zangezur corridor topic emerges it is clear how worried is the country’s political estalishement. Indeed, the idea of a Turkic corridor stretching all along Iran’s northern border is deemed a major geopolitical chellenge.

Tensions will surely remain short of major escalation but Ankara and Tehran will continue to see each other in the Middle East or the South Caucasus as major competitors. The two will likewise have differing visions on the role of non-state military groups. Supported by Iran and representing the sprawling Axis of Resistance, the latter is often seen as a problem by Ankara because it fears the expansion of Iran-Israel conflict could embolden Kurdish elements in nothern Syria and Iraq. Turkey and Iran also differ on Yemen with each supporting either Houthi de-facto leadership or the official government in Sanaa.

Turkey and Iran will therefore face a whole array of problematic issues. But given the history of their cooperation and competition, it seems that under the new Iranian leadership in critical times deconfliction will be successfully managed.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

[Emil Avdaliani]