Editorial : Lessons from Land Application List System
文章日期:2024年12月13日

【明報專訊】HONG KONG'S PROPERTY MARKET has been sluggish, and the government's land sales revenue has dropped drastically. Recently, there have been views from political and business circles again that the Application List System for land sales should be resumed to "revitalise the land market".

Looking back at the history of land sales in Hong Kong, it was mostly the government that took the initiative to put sites up for public auction. After the Asian financial crisis in 1998, Hong Kong experienced a severe economic recession. The government launched the Application List System in the following year to prevent abortive auctions from dampening property market sentiments. Under the system, the government would allocate some of the sites it intended to sell onto the Application List.

A developer who was interested in any site on the list could apply for the sale of the site and offer a reserve price. After the site was successfully taken off the list, it would go under the hammer. Since the developer had taken the initiative to trigger the land sale and the reserve price was accepted by the government at the very beginning, there was certainty that the site being auctioned would be sold.

In the early days of the Application System, it was in place alongside regular land sales. However, the property market remained in the doldrums, and the government suspended both land sales and the Application System in 2002. It was not until 2004 that the Application System was resumed while regular land sales were completely abandoned.

The Hong Kong property market thus entered a period of uncontrollable surge. For several consecutive years, the government did not take the initiative to sell land, and developers rarely applied for sites to be auctioned. Although the government resumed active land sales in 2010 and completely abolished the Application List mechanism in 2013, the serious shortfall in the supply of land and housing had already become a major scourge of Hong Kong and remained unsolved for many years.

According to the government's statement at the time, the objective of introducing the Application List policy was to "let the market determine the appropriate supply and stabilise property prices". However, subsequent developments have been a damning indictment of the serious flaws of the Application System. On the one hand, developers could deliberately refrain from triggering land auctions to put properties in tight supply and drive up property prices. Big developers with huge land reserves were especially capable of doing so.

On the other hand, small- and medium-sized developers without sufficient land reserves needed to spend manpower and resources to conduct assessments before applying for a site to be auctioned. However, during a public auction, a premium site usually went into the hands of developers with substantial financial strength and power. The developer that took the land off the list ended up doing the legwork for large developers. No doubt they had no interest in triggering land auctions afterwards.

There are views that the resumption of the Application List can give developers another option, and the government can continue to take the initiative to put sites up for tender. The problem is that the availability of a different land sale option does not mean developers will actively bid for land. Worse still, if developers can choose when to bid and only bid for premium sites, they might be even less interested in the projects that have been put out to tender by the authorities.

Hong Kong is a capitalist society. It is impossible to force the business sector to do business at a loss. This, however, does not mean that the market is king and the business community dictates everything. As Hong Kong has entered a new era of development, the relationship between the government and the business sector needs to be sorted out. Both sides need to show sincerity and work together to achieve a win-win situation.

明報社評2024.12.12:土地供應政府主導 莫忘勾地歷史教訓

本港樓市疲弱,政府賣地收入大減,政商界近期又再出現聲音,建議重推勾地制度,「搞活土地市場」。

回顧本地賣地歷史,大多數時候都是由政府主動推地公開拍賣,及至1998年亞洲金融風暴後,香港經濟嚴重衰退,政府為免流拍打擊樓市情緒,翌年推出勾地制度,由政府將一些有意出售的土地放入「勾地表」。

發展商若有興趣,可提出勾地申請並報出底價,成功勾出後再公開拍賣。由於土地是發展商主動勾出,底價一開始也得到政府接受,意味勾出的土地肯定可以賣出。

勾地制度引入初期,也是與常規賣地「雙軌並行」,惟後來樓市持續不振,政府2002年索性暫停賣地及勾地,直至2004年,勾地制度「單軌復行」,定期賣地則全面取消。

此後本港樓市開始進入失控狂飈時期,政府連續多年沒有主動賣地,發展商勾地申請也少之又少。雖然政府2010年恢復主動賣地、2013年全面取消勾地機制,然而土地房屋供應出現嚴重斷層,已成為了香港重大禍患,多年之後仍未能化解。

根據當年政府說法,引入勾地政策,目標是「讓市場決定合適供應,穩定物業價格」,然而往後事態發展證明,勾地制度存在嚴重問題。一方面,發展商可以刻意不勾地,令樓市供應持續緊張,從而推高樓價,手握大量土地儲備的大型發展商,尤其有本錢這樣做。

另一方面,沒有足夠土儲的中小型發展商,申請勾地前需要先花人力物力做評估,但勾出「靚地」公開拍賣的結果,往往是由財雄勢大的發展商拿下,勾地者變相為大發展商作嫁衣裳,之後當然不會有勾地意欲。

有意見認為,恢復勾地可以讓發展商有多一個選擇,政府依然可以繼續主動推地招標。問題是多一個賣地方法,不等於發展商就會積極投地;更甚的是,既然發展商可以「擇時機而勾」、「擇靚地而勾」,對當局的招標項目就可能更沒興趣。

香港是資本主義社會,不能逼商界做蝕本生意,但也不等於「市場大晒」、商界想怎話事就怎話事。香港發展進入新時期,理順政商關係,需要雙方拿出誠意,攜手合作,實現多方共贏。

■ Glossary 生字 /

doldrums : a lack of activity or improvement

scourge : a person or thing that causes trouble, difficulty or mental pain

legwork : difficult or boring work that takes a lot of time and effort, but that is thought to be less important